Did Russia’s war in Ukraine lead to a European Zeitenwende?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has an enormous impact on the current and future security of Europe. This Clingendael Spectator series analyses how Europe’s relation with Ukraine and Russia will be affected. In the final episode, Clingendael expert Tony van der Togt reflects on the series’ five contributions to examine whether the EU has truly transformed into a more geopolitical actor in response to the war.

In the series ‘How Russia’s war changed Europe’, various experts have analysed the consequences of the war in Ukraine for the European Union’s relations with Ukraine, Russia and other countries in both Europe and the Global South.1 While these analyses have highlighted significant shifts in external relations, the EU is also undergoing internal reflection about its identity as a peace project or a geopolitical player, its place in a world order increasingly defined by power dynamics, and the finalité of European integration.

Has the EU truly evolved into a more geopolitical actor in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine? This concluding article builds on insights from the previous contributions, synthesising the most salient points to assess not only where the EU stands today but also potential future developments in its external and internal relations.

A more geopolitical EU in the making
All authors in this series agree that the war in Ukraine has accelerated the EU’s development into a more geopolitical player. The shift towards a more geopolitical perspective was not entirely new, as evidenced by the inaugural statements of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2019 about a “geopolitical Commission” and the EU’s concept of “principled pragmatism” in its external relations.

However, Russia’s war of aggression seemed to have provided the final impetus for this new direction. This resulted in collective actions like using the European Peace Facility for military support to Ukraine and incorporating geopolitical considerations more explicitly into EU enlargement policies to counter the influence of external actors like Russia and China. But did it also result in a real Zeitenwende, fundamentally transforming the EU both internally and in its external relations?

It remains crucial for the EU to support Ukraine steadfastly, as long as it takes and whatever it takes

The war in Europe has uprooted the European security order in unprecedented ways. It also finally put an end to policymaking based on the assumption that more contacts and cooperation would inherently foster peace and stability, as not only the old German Ostpolitik but also the EU’s approach towards Russia presumed for a long time.

As pointed out in this series, EU-Russia relations have reached an absolute low point, marked by increased decoupling in trade relations, especially in the energy sector, and growing confrontations about Ukraine and its place within the European security order.2 Additionally, there is an ideological dimension, with the current regime in Moscow increasingly portraying Russia as a separate state-civilisation with its own (traditional) norms and values, which it perceives as under threat from malign (Western) influences.

Conversely, Ukraine’s wish to deepen its ties with the EU and fully embrace European norms and values has prompted the EU to prioritise its relationship with Ukraine. Subsequently, the EU now views its relations with Russia through the prism of the war in Ukraine, shifting away from a Moscow-centric perspective in its approach to Ukraine.

A more geopolitical outlook has spurred renewed efforts towards enlargement, not only involving Ukraine but also Moldova and potentially Georgia (as part of the Eastern trio), as well as the Western Balkans.3 At the same time, discussions on enlargement have sparked divisions among member states and renewed Russian efforts to influence or actively oppose European tendencies in Georgia, Moldova and the Western Balkans.4

In this context, Ukraine seems to be moving in the right direction. However, it faces enormous challenges concerning defence capabilities, economic and social recovery, the role of civil society in fostering democracy and the rule of law, and bolstering resilience against Russian disinformation on its bumpy road towards the EU.5 It remains crucial for the EU to support Ukraine steadfastly, 'as long as it takes and whatever it takes'.

While Ukraine has succeeded in pushing Russian forces back from some parts of its territory, the war is far from over

Nonetheless, with member states like Hungary and the rise of populist and nationalist forces across Europe, substantial future support remains uncertain. Moreover, public opinion polls in Europe indicate limited popular backing for Ukrainian EU membership. Thus, while Ukraine has succeeded in pushing Russian forces back from some parts of its territory, the war is far from over.

The European Union also faces challenges concerning its relations with other global or regional players. While this series has, for example, not focused on relations with the United States, concerns about the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House and a potential decrease in American commitment to European security and support for Ukraine are looming large at the time of writing. These issues profoundly influence discussions about the future of European security, echoing recent remarks by French president Emmanuel Macron: "Our Europe, today, is mortal and it can die. It can die and this depends only on our choices."6

Furthermore, when examining the European Union’s relations with the Global South, the EU grapples with its historical roles and policies that traditionally framed the Global South through the lenses of development, conflict resolution and migration, rather than from a broader geopolitical angle. Moreover, disparities in the application of international law, notably highlighted in comparisons between the EU’s reaction to Russia’s aggression and Israel’s actions in Gaza, lead to more fundamental divides between the EU and countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

At the same time, as pointed out in this series as well, Ukraine is increasingly reaching out to the Global South to garner support for resolving the conflict with Russia.7 While Kyiv has seen some advancements, particularly regarding President Zelensky’s peace proposals, this support is far from solid and has fallen on deaf ears in Beijing, prompting China to influence other countries not to support any peace talks without Russian participation. Therefore, only a few states from the Global South recently participated in the conference in Switzerland on 15 and 16 June to make some progress on a limited number of points of Zelensky’s proposals.

Considering future scenario’s for Russia, China plays a big role, especially in a scenario where Russia would be turned into a Chinese propped-up proxy and more or less a Chinese vassal state.8 While Beijing may not directly provide military equipment, its significant purchases of Russian energy and resources, along with the provision of dual-use technology, continue to bolster Moscow’s ability to sustain its war efforts against Ukraine and foster optimism within the Kremlin that it could emerge victorious in a long – if not forever – war.

A real Zeitenwende or only some small steps forward?
As mentioned before, Russia’s threat to the European security order has reignited old discussions about Europe’s boundaries and commitment to its values. These issues are still far from resolved. Therefore, it remains important to investigate whether all changes since February 2022 aimed at turning the EU into a more geopolitical actor will also lead to more fundamental internal reforms and contribute to an EU that is willing and able to play a more sovereign and autonomous role on the world stage in the years to come. In this context, several key points need to be addressed. 

One could only conclude that the EU still has a long and bumpy road ahead if it wants to become a real geopolitical player

First, what is the outlook for reforming the EU itself, considering the challenges of integrating large neighbouring states like Ukraine into the current decision-making processes and budgetary frameworks? Exploring the expansion of qualified majority voting into additional sectors, including in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), could perhaps offer a solution to blocking and resistance by a small minority of member states. Or the EU could find a formula in which a coalition of the willing, like the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland), takes the lead in a smaller format, thus circumventing blockages to further progress. Furthermore, reforming the EU’s agricultural policy could be considered to avoid allocating a significant portion of the budget to support Ukrainian farmers and to prevent more EU member states from becoming net contributors to the EU’s budget, which leads to firm resistance to enlargement across the EU.

Second, what are the prospects for European sovereignty in defence and security matters? If the US were to reduce its commitment to European security and/or redirect its focus to other regions, the EU needs to assume a greater role in securing its own neighbourhood, including Eastern Partnership states and the Western Balkans. Could the EU enhance its security cooperation with countries like Ukraine or Moldova to turn into a more effective geopolitical player in its immediate vicinity, including the stationing of EU civilian and military missions in neighbouring countries? This might also involve the EU collectively considering the deployment of ‘boots on the ground’ in crisis situations, as recently suggested by President Macron for France, which could significantly impact the application of Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty (akin to NATO’s famous Article 5).

Third, what should the EU do about democratic backsliding among its own member states, including in Hungary and Slovakia? If, in the distant future, states like Ukraine can become EU members based on a strict interpretation of the Copenhagen criteria, what could prevent a slide back to less democratic systems with diminished respect for the rule of law? Relying solely on pro-European forces inside individual countries and supporting NGOs is insufficient, as the current challenges in candidate-member Georgia demonstrate. Additionally, the long and painful history of enlargement in the Western Balkans raises some fundamental questions about the enlargement process as a whole.

Fourth, could the EU develop an effective response to (hybrid) threats by countries like Russia and China that aim to divide Europe and make it a less effective player? The EU would need a strategy to work towards a new security architecture that includes a more democratic and non-aggressive Russia, should Moscow change its course after a defeat in Ukraine (if and when that happens at all).

And finally, could the EU formulate its own credible narrative to support a truly multilateral rules-based order, collaborating with other states – both in its immediate surroundings and globally – based on common democratic values and international law? The current discussions on the EU’s role in the Middle East, including in finding a solution to Israel’s war in Gaza and offering a realistic perspective of a two-state solution, do not bode well for a more geopolitical EU.

A long and bumpy road ahead
When considering these issues, one could only conclude that the EU still has a long and bumpy road ahead if it wants to become a real geopolitical player, able to protect its interests and values globally and in its own region. For this to happen, the European Union needs a common vision and strategy that all member states support, clearly articulating what the EU stands for and its perspective on the world order, both internally and externally.

Unless the EU gets its act together, Macron’s warning about a Europe that could still die may well become reality

However, so far, the EU mostly seems to be able to move forward piecemeal and in reaction to outside crises, like the Russian threat to the European security order. And even then, looking at the time and lengthy discussions it took to move from an agreement on the first sanctions package against Russia to the fourteenth, this does not bode well for effective crisis management. The many exceptions demanded by individual member states and the ease with which their companies are still finding loopholes hardly make sanctions more effective as a geopolitical and geo-economic instrument.

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe still look towards the US and NATO for their security rather than the EU. And for the same reason Finland and Sweden wanted to become NATO members, instead of relying on the EU’s article 42.7 in case of an acute threat to their security. Having a Strategic Compass for the EU is great, but in crisis situations one could still pose Joseph Stalin’s question regarding the pope: “How many divisions does he have?”

One of the main issues remains a lack of political unity in the EU (for which plenty examples could be seen in the campaigns for the European elections). This implies huge opportunities for countries like Russia to divide the EU internally by stimulating polarisation, undermining any prospect for building a closer Union and excluding those partners willing to become members based on shared values.

In this context, autocratic member states and populist far-right and far-left forces are striving to undermine the European project, thereby boosting the influence of a totalitarian and aggressive Russia on the European continent. Unless the EU gets its act together, Macron’s warning about a Europe that could still die may well become reality. For a true Zeitenwende, much more is urgently needed than the incremental steps towards a geopolitical EU in reaction to Russia’s war on the European security order.

• 1The previous contributions of the series ‘How Russia’s War Changed Europe’: Andriy Korniychuk, ‘New allies? Ukraine’s diplomatic battle in the Global South’, Clingendael Spectator, 5 October 2023; Sergey Utkin, ‘A deep divide; the long-term EU-Russia decoupling’, Clingendael Spectator, 9 November 2023; Niels Drost and Bob Deen, ‘How the war might change Russia: 6 possible futures’, Clingendael Spectator, 21 December 2023; Wouter Zweers, ‘The Eastern trio’s path to the EU: fast-track or slow lane?’, Clingendael Spectator, 27 February 2024; Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld, ‘Resilience amidst war: Ukraine’s road ahead’, Clingendael Spectator, 29 April 2024.
• 2Sergey Utkin, ‘A deep divide; the long-term EU-Russia decoupling’, Clingendael Spectator, 9 November 2023.
• 3Wouter Zweers, ‘The Eastern trio’s path to the EU: fast-track or slow lane?’, Clingendael Spectator, 27 February 2024.
• 4Wouter Zweers, Niels Drost and Baptiste Henry, ‘Russian influence in Serbia, Bosna and Herzegovina and Montenegro’, Clingendael Institute, 17 August 2023.
• 5Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld, ‘Resilience amidst war: Ukraine’s road ahead’, Clingendael Spectator, 29 April 2024.
• 6Emmanuel Macron, ‘Europe Speech’, Élysée, 25 April 2024.
• 7Andriy Korniychuk, ‘New allies? Ukraine’s diplomatic battle in the Global South’, Clingendael Spectator, 5 October 2023.
• 8Niels Drost and Bob Deen, ‘How the war might change Russia: 6 possible futures’, Clingendael Spectator, 21 December 2023.