India must exert its soft power in the Indian Ocean

This is one of the four winning student columns from the Clingendael Spectator student column competition for the summer of 2024, written by Arne Ronneberger.1  

While many geopolitical observers focus on the growing rivalry between the United States and China, the role of India in shaping the future global order is often overlooked. The world’s most populous country boasts rapidly expanding economic capabilities and decades of experience in strategic competition with China.

When trying to understand the dynamics of the Indian Ocean, some analysists underestimate the importance of the small island state of the Maldives. The Maldives holds enormous strategic value for India due to its proximity to the Indian coast, where foreign influence can be precarious. Following last year’s elections in the island state, China’s influence has increased, posing a potential threat to Indian security and paving the way for a stronger Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. To counter Chinese influence and ensure stability, India must exert its soft power in the region to revive its partnership with the island state.

These developments could also pose a severe challenge to the European Union, as they might change the strategic landscape of the region. Situated in the middle of the Indian Ocean, the Maldives possess a decisive location concerning the EU’s important trade routes to the Middle East and East Asia. Assuring stability along these waterways should be a vital interest for the EU.

The Maldives is said to be the missing part to complete the ‘string of pearls’ around India’s coast which could cut off Indian trade

Historically, the Maldives has kept close relations with its neighbour India under its long-lasting ‘India First’ policy. The accession of the Maldives to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in 2014 brought the first major power shift on the islands. Indian officials fear a possible Chinese encirclement of India’s coastline. To connect the Chinese-owned ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, the Maldives is said to be the missing part to complete the so-called ‘string of pearls’ around India’s coast which could cut off Indian trade.

India is keen to maintain its successful partnership with the Maldives to minimise the Chinese threat. However, the latest Maldivian elections, held in 2023, have brought radical change and a major setback in Indo-Maldivian relations. Newly elected President Mohamed Muizzu has implemented an ‘India Out’ policy and ordered the Indian military to leave the Maldives in May 2024. Simultaneously, the Maldives signed a military assistance agreement with China, allowing the stationing of Chinese vessels in Maldivian ports. Religious mobilisation in President Muizzu’s campaign also opened a cultural dimension in the conflict with India and has played a decisive role in bringing the relationship to its current all-time low.

India should weather the current period, and in the meantime prepare a deeper relationship with its neighbour for the future. Time will be in India’s favour as the Maldivian government will eventually realise its still-existing dependence on India to manage its debt for investment projects and to provide quick humanitarian aid for the frequent natural catastrophes in the country.

India should focus on building a deeper and more stable relationship with the Maldives by addressing the concerns of the Maldivian population

However, by addressing the strong anti-India sentiment in the Maldives, future anti-India governments can be prevented in the first place. India’s perceived maltreatment of Muslim minorities is a stimulant to this sentiment, as the Maldives is a predominantly Muslim country. While India and the Maldives share tight cultural and linguistic roots, the increasing emphasis on Hinduism in India and Islam in the Maldives has driven the countries apart. Continued touristic exchange could help bridge these gaps and reduce prejudices. Currently, India is using the Maldives’ dependency on tourism as a means of pressure, but this approach may incur significant long-term costs. By focusing on providing loans and investing in infrastructure, India can foster a more positive relationship with the Maldivian people.

Additionally, India’s strategic diversification through cooperation with Myanmar, Indonesia and other countries bordering the Indian Ocean is a crucial counter to the Chinese threat and should be expanded. India successfully competes with China for strategic alliances by securing agreements in key locations. For instance, the Indian-owned Sittwe Port in Myanmar and the construction of an Indian port in the Indonesia’s Sabang Province provide India with significant leverage over crucial waterways. In the event of a long-term pro-China government in the Maldives, these partnerships will offer valuable alternatives.

Nevertheless, in light of its expulsion, India should focus on building a deeper and more stable relationship with the Maldives by addressing the concerns of the Maldivian population. By leveraging its soft power in the Indian Ocean, India can play a decisive role in limiting Chinese power and stabilising trade routes that flow all the way to Europe.

• 1Many thanks to Clingendael Spectator intern Huub van Gisbergen for taking on and successfully managing the student column competition for the summer of 2024 as a dedicated project.