How the China Cleavage Shapes Taiwan’s Elections
China’s long-running territorial disputes regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea have become two of Asia’s biggest flashpoints. This Clingendael Spectator series delves deeper into these issues, offering insights beyond the headlines. n the fourth episode, Clingendael expert Sense Hofstede analyses Taiwan’s electoral dynamics leading up to the January 2024 elections. The outcome of the votes will shape the direction of the island amidst the growing turbulence in the waters surrounding China.
On 13 January 2024, the Taiwanese electorate heads to the polling booths. The voters will elect a new parliament and a new president. Their choices will determine the island’s course in the increasingly choppy waters off China.
The incoming government will face the existential challenge of Xi Jinping’s assertive policies claiming that Taiwan should be part of its territory. A similar claim over the islets and reefs of the neighbouring South China Sea adds to regional tension.
As this turbulence increases, there is a growing consensus among the Taiwanese people about who they are. However, their opinions diverge on Taiwan’s geopolitical position in the world. Where voters place Taiwan on the geopolitical map in January will also reverberate in Europe.
To comprehend the electoral dynamics, it is important to understand two things. First, voters generally agree that they are Taiwanese. Second, the determining factor in Taiwanese politics is not the right-left divide as we know in Europe, but the so-called ‘China Cleavage’ – the split attitude towards Taiwan’s national identity and how this identity relates to China.
In January, nearly 20 million Taiwanese voters will have a choice between three political parties: the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). Each party represents a different position relative to the China Cleavage.
In the run-up to the elections, this article provides some background on the pivotal China Cleavage, which has become mainly about Taiwan’s attitude towards Beijing. It then analyses the three political parties participating in the elections. Where do they stand in relation to the China Cleavage? Finally, the analysis shifts it focus to those faced with the choice among these options: the voters.
Taiwanese know who they are
Taiwan’s electorate has always been less polarised than the fierce appearance of its competitive political landscape and contentious press suggests.
Survey results show that more than sixty per cent of Taiwan’s population currently identify as Taiwanese only. The remainder identifies as both Taiwanese and Chinese, except for a negligible 2.5 per cent who identify solely as Chinese.
With the elimination of domestic dictatorship, the China Cleavage has become more about Taiwan’s attitude to Beijing
Whether ROC or Taiwan, its people want to maintain its sovereignty. There is an overwhelming rejection of specific Chinese proposals that suggest integration into the PRC.
Yet, the frequent bandying about of the term ‘status quo’ conceals the evolving comprehension of its meaning. The political movement that gave rise to the ruling DPP emerged in response to the bloody dictatorship of the KMT, marked by systematic discrimination against the majority of Taiwanese descended from those living there before 1945.
However, since the end of the Cold War, the ROC has become democratic and its symbols more aligned with Taiwanese culture. This shift has diminished the sense of urgency for formal independence among Taiwanese nationalists. Almost ninety per cent of respondents now treat the once polarising formal name of the state, ‘Republic of China’, as generally synonymous with ‘Taiwan’.
The choices
Between 1945 and 2000, Taiwan was ruled by one party: the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Rebuilt from the remnants of the KMT that was defeated by the CCP in 1949 and local factions on Taiwan, the subsequent Taiwanese KMT governed the island with iron fist under a bloody martial law regime underpinned by their brand of Chinese nationalism that ended with democratisation over the course of the 1990s.
In Taiwanese politics, the KMT’s side of the China Cleavage is known as the ‘Blue Camp’. The KMT no longer seeks to “retake the Mainland”, but it continues to prioritise Taiwan’s connections with China. However, their much-touted campaign argument that Beijing does engage in dialogue with the KMT stems from the party’s willingness to use unpopular terminology implying that Taiwan is part of ‘China’.
The evolution of Taiwanese identity has shifted the midpoint of the China Cleavage away from the Blue Camp.
Current president Tsai Ing-wen (in office since 2016) upholds what some call the ‘Tsai Doctrine’.
Determining where one wishes to stand also hinges on one’s risk appetite
This definition of the status quo is in line with the majority view.
Tsai’s government has pursued closer ties with the US and Japan, economic diversification away from China, and military modernisation. In response, the opposition has accused the DPP of betraying Taiwan,
Nonetheless, the most effective opposition criticism centres on accusations of government corruption and incompetence. Many voters are unhappy with rising living costs and uncertain future prospects. After eight years of DPP governance, the majority wants a change of government.
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), established in 2019 and led by former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, tries to distinguish itself from the “ideological” squabbling of the ‘green’ DPP and ‘blue’ KMT. Positioned as a ‘white’ party that focusses on people’s livelihood, the TPP accuses the DPP of jeopardising peace and the KMT of bowing to China. Ko claims to be pragmatic rather than “political”, although his party’s stance on China is better described as ‘light blue’.
The voters
Voters are pretty clear that Taiwan is different from China. The point of contention is how different it should be. Similar to how many US voters shape their views through Democratic or Republican alignment (rather than the other way around), political scientists observe that Taiwanese voters formulate their opinions based on their relation to ‘China’, the China Cleavage.
Over the decades, the meaning of that ‘China’ in Taiwanese usage has evolved, shifting from an inclusive reference including Taiwan to being generally about the PRC or Mainland China.
However, KMT President Ma Ying-jeou’s (2008-2016) agenda of economic integration with China went further than society was able to accept.
Since then, Taiwan’s relation with China has come to shape the China Cleavage. This is not about unification. While there may be room for speculation regarding the ultimate motives of Chinese nationalists within the Blue Camp,
In a 2020 poll testing hypothetical scenarios, two-thirds of respondents expressed support for formal independence if peace were guaranteed.
The Green and Blue camps can rely on a secure base of independence supporters and opponents respectively. But the status quo supporters cast the deciding vote. The party that successfully manages to convince enough of this part of the Taiwanese electorate will win in January 2024.
The competition for support from the middle voter puts pressure on candidates to distance themselves from Chinese demands
Polling shows that antipathy against the KMT has declined.
The three-way contest for the Taiwanese presidency echoes the elections in the pivotal year 2000. Chen Shui-bian brought the DPP into the presidential office for the first time thanks to a split vote. However, he had to govern while Blue Camp opposition parties used their blocking majority in parliament.
A replay of that scenario is now on the horizon. In the two-thirds of the seats elected via single-member districts, local concerns as well as economic considerations will weaken the China Cleavage’s benefits for the Green Camp. Polling shows the DPP is weak in the remaining one third elected via party list vote as well. Even if Lai wins the presidency, the legislative majority hangs in the balance.
A return to the gridlock?
Under any conceivable scenario, political integration with the PRC is not a viable option; a majority of Taiwanese would never accept it.
In contrast to the Taiwanese view, for Beijing the ‘status quo’ means that Taiwan is legally part of the PRC, but that Beijing is for now unable to exercise its administrative control in practice. Chinese statements consistently assert that the country maintains control over the situation, implying it is not in a hurry yet.
However, Beijing is already “implementing an increasingly aggressive campaign of coercion without violence against Taiwan”.
A KMT or TPP victory would see a turn away from the US-centred and Japan-friendly foreign policy of Tsai Ing-wen. The new president’s attempts to create conditions for dialogue with Beijing could move beyond recognising that Taiwan is part of a ‘China’. So far, Taipei has joined tech sanctions against Russia and is not strongly pushing back against American attempts to control semiconductor technology export to China. That could change.
Taiwan faces serious domestic challenges that extend beyond cross-Strait politics. To effectively address issues such as bureaucratic reform, military modernisation, and climate challenges, a president will need cooperation from parliament. In a country unused to coalition governments and with a history of obstructionism from both sides, but especially the KMT, there is a possibility of a return to the gridlock of the Chen years.
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