What to expect from a summit on the Eastern Ukraine crisis?
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What to expect from a summit on the Eastern Ukraine crisis?

09 Oct 2019 - 14:41
Photo: Ukrainian army cuts of the main road to Sloviansk, East Ukraine. © Sasha Maksymenko/Flickr
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Preparations are underway for a Normandy Four summit on Ukraine to be held shortly in Paris. But apart from haute cuisine, what will actually be on the table when the leaders meet?

The Normandy format was created in June 2014 on the margins of the 70th anniversary of D-day and it brings together France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia to discuss the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ukraine (not Crimea, which in Russia’s view is a domestic issue). A crisis that according to UN estimates has cost some 13,000 lives since it erupted in early 2014.

For the last three years the Normandy leaders have not met. The election of Ukrainian president Zelensky, who has vowed to bring this protracted conflict to an end, and the recent exchange of 70 prisoners and detainees between Ukraine and Russia (with maybe more to follow) seem to have created an atmosphere more conducive to diplomacy. Furthermore, French president Macron, who wants to upgrade relations with Russia, has stepped forward and is actively engaged in resuscitating this high-level process.

Klijn-foto- OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in the Donetsk region in 2017. © OSCE
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in the Donetsk region in 2017. © OSCE

The basis for these talks are the so-called Minsk agreements, which refers to a Protocol and Memorandum signed in September 2014 and a subsequent Package of Measures of February 2015, endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolution 2202 and sometimes called the Minsk-II agreement.

These documents were negotiated in Belarus’ capital (president Lukashenka cleverly offered to host these talks, allowing him to take a neutral stance), facilitated by the Vienna-based Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). All documents were signed by representatives of Ukraine and Russia, but also by the self-proclaimed leaderships of the break-away ‘republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk. Meanwhile, the bulk of the EU sanctions initiated since 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its involvement in Eastern Ukraine are tied to ‘full implementation’ by Russia of the Minsk agreements.

Moscow officially claims it is not involved in Eastern Ukraine. It was therefore only going to sign up to commitments that would sustain that postition

These agreements, more often mentioned than scrutinised, are problematic. At the time, considering military circumstances, Ukraine did not have much choice but to agree to these documents, even if they were vague about sequencing and lopsided in the sense that Russia is hardly mentioned at all. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Moscow officially claims it is not involved in Eastern Ukraine. It was therefore only going to sign up to commitments that would sustain that position.

Klijn-foto-A member of the Ukrainian vehicle decontamination team in exercise Rapid Trident, an annual, multinational exercise, which took place in Ukraine in September 2019. © NATO
A member of the Ukrainian vehicle decontamination team in exercise Rapid Trident, an annual, multinational exercise, which took place in Ukraine in September 2019. © NATO

Russia consistently positions itself as an outside mediator rather than a belligerent party, and this is reflected in the agreements. It demands that Ukraine does its political homework, such as enacting a special status law for the East1, organising local elections and instituting constitutional reforms that would allow for decentralisation.

Minsk gives the Russians a free ride and leaves plenty of room for political bickering

At the same time, the agreements refer to home-grown militants when it comes to the principal requirements of a general cease-fire and withdrawal of forces and weaponry (requirements that never materialised). In short, Minsk gives the Russians a free ride and leaves plenty of room for political bickering.

Still, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Prystayko has claimed there is agreement on the so-called Steinmeier formula: a proposal from 2016 by the then German Foreign Minister saying that the special status law takes provisional effect at the time of local elections, but is only confirmed after OSCE observers have established the vote was free and fair.

Reportedly, another condition for a summit meeting is the disengagement of forces from a few hotspots around the ‘line of contact’ (something which according to Minsk should have happened a long time ago).

Hopes should be pinned on the two main parties being more incentivised than before to make headway

Therefore, if and when Macron, Merkel, Zelensky and Putin meet in Paris, the Minsk acquis will loom in the background, but hardly serves as a precise roadmap towards peace. Rather, hopes should be pinned on the two main parties being more incentivised than before to make headway.

Klijn-foto-Joint press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy in June 2019. © NATO
Joint press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy in June 2019. © NATO

For President Zelensky it is important to make good on his election promise to resolve the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, while keeping the Crimea issue on the back burner. For President Putin, the Donbas stalemate has become a nagging and costly affair. At some point, given the state of Russia’s economy, he would like to see sanction relief – just as some EU countries would like to revisit this regime.

However, Russia’s narrative of non-involvement becomes increasingly perilous, judging from Russia’s insistence on including Ukrainian MH17 witness, and possible suspect, Volodymyr Tsemach in the recent prisoner swap to keep him away from international justice.

One should realise that at the end of the day Russia will only settle for arrangements that ensure sufficient leverage over its neighbour to prevent it from joining the West; the very same agenda that prompted Russia to intervene in Ukraine in the first place.

Novice Zelensky, already under pressure for being too close to controversial oligarchs and now even enmeshed in a US impeachment inquiry, cannot be seen to trade away the integrity of his country and its future orientation. Recently, demonstrators in front of his office in Kyiv warned against ‘the treason of Normandy’.

Absent a level playing field, the most important thing now is to have this long-overdue summit take place and provide the opportunity for a first in-depth conversation between Zelensky and Putin. Building bilateral trust is key to managing and ultimately resolving this conflict. It is up to Macron and Merkel to supervise progress while considering Ukraine’s interests: a delicate but important role.

 

Auteurs

Hugo Klijn
Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute