The Eastern Trio’s path to the EU: Fast-track or slow lane?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has an enormous impact on the current and future security of Europe. This Clingendael Spectator series analyses how Europe’s relation with Ukraine and Russia will be affected. In the fourth episode, Clingendael expert Wouter Zweers reflects on the progress and obstacles in the accession journey of the ‘Eastern Trio’ (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) towards the EU, as well as on the new enlargement dynamics in the EU.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has radically altered Kyiv’s relation with the European Union. Deemed out of the question before the invasion by multiple EU member states including the Netherlands, Ukraine received EU candidate status in June 2022 by a unanimous EU decision.

A year and a half later, at the European Council in December 2023, the country, alongside Moldova, also managed to secure the opening of accession negotiations. This time, the EU had more difficulty coming to a joint conclusion. Consensus was only reached after a rather unprecedented diplomatic trick that saw Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán temporarily leaving the Council room.1

For EU standards, things [after 24 February 2022] moved at lightning speed

This December European Council was exemplary for the uncertainties surrounding the process of joining the EU. As would be clear from the state of affairs in the Western Balkans countries, which have been knocking on the door for many years, becoming an EU member can be a lengthy and cumbersome process.

This article reflects on the progress and challenges in the accession paths of Ukraine and Moldova towards the EU and on the new enlargement dynamics in the EU after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. What are the barriers and opportunities for both the candidates and the European Union itself? Even though it is unlikely for both countries to escape some of the same unconstructive dynamics that continue to dominate the EU accession process of the Western Balkans, it remains crucial for the EU to keep its act together on Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession processes.

Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession paths so far
In 2016, the Netherlands held an advisory referendum in which a majority of voters opposed the Association Agreement (AA) between Ukraine and the EU. Back then, this prompted the Netherlands to negotiate an annex to the AA, clarifying that it did not constitute a stepping stone for EU membership.2

Fast forward seven years, the tables have turned. As cynical as it is, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has created a geopolitical urgency for EU members to seriously consider enlargement towards its Eastern vicinity. Likewise, it has strengthened the security imperative for Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia – the ‘Eastern trio’ – to seek shelter in the EU family.

For EU standards, things thereafter moved at lightning speed. After formally submitting their membership applications in late February and early March 2022,3 the European Commission needed just over four months to complete its basic assessment, the Avis in EU speak, of the three countries’ respective readiness to become a formal candidate. Even Georgia – which received candidate status in December 2023, a year and a half later than the other two – has almost been twice as quick than the average of 3.1 years that it took current members (excluding the founding ones) to do so.4

When comparing the Eastern trio’s progress with that of the aspiring EU members in the Western Balkans, the contrast is even sharper. While Ukraine and Moldova were granted green light to open accession negotiations in just under two years after their applications, it took North Macedonia a whopping sixteen years to do the same. Meanwhile, seven years after its application to join the bloc, Bosnia and Herzegovina has only managed to achieve candidate status. And what to think of Montenegro and Serbia, which have been negotiating their EU accession since 2012 and 2014 respectively. None of the countries in the region are foreseen to join the EU anytime soon.

Changing imperatives for enlargement
So, what got the accession engine running for the Eastern trio and why did it stall in the Western Balkans? First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine altered EU priorities. Despite ongoing efforts since 2003, enlargement within the Western Balkans was overshadowed for years by negative public perceptions stemming from the EU’s big bang enlargement round of 2004-2007. Additionally, internal crises within the EU – including the Euro crisis, migration management crisis and rule of law crisis – led to a mostly inward-focused approach. While a little simplistic, there is a kernel of truth in the regularly heard phrase that “for years the EU pretended it wanted to enlarge, and the Western Balkans pretended they did the necessary reforms”.5

Some EU leaders have openly admitted that only Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reversed these dynamics. Even in the traditionally critical Dutch parliament, the geopolitical imperatives for further EU expansion are being recognised. The argument is that the attack on Ukraine is an attack on democracy in Europe as such. In order to safeguard European norms and values as well as the sovereign choices of European nations regarding their future, the EU must acknowledge Moldova’s, Ukraine’s and Georgia’s aspirations to join the EU family.

Driven by existential threats, the two countries displayed a steep reform curve on those requirements the European Commission identified as crucial to unlock accession talks

In the same vein, EU leaders also argue that the EU should revitalise the process with the Western Balkans, which has been stagnant for many years. In the Netherlands, by the way, this argument is often reversed to advocate for Western Balkan governments to finally make a definitive turn towards the West.6

A second and equally important factor contributing to swift progress in especially Moldova and Ukraine, is that since the invasion, reform energy in these countries has exceeded that of the Western Balkans. Driven by existential threats, the two countries displayed a steep reform curve on those requirements the European Commission identified as crucial to unlock accession talks.

Ukraine, for example, brought its selection procedures for Constitutional Court judges up to Venice Commission recommended standards, adopted a media law to empower the independent media regulator, and ensured compliance of its anti-money laundering legislation with the standards of the Financial Action Task Force.7 Similarly, Moldova improved public procurement regulations, enhanced capacities of its public administration, and improved legislation to tackle organised (financial) crime.8 Importantly, apart from technical reforms on which further improvements will be needed in the months and years to come, both governments have displayed an open political approach and commitment to the EU integration path of their respective countries.

Georgia missed out on candidate status in 2022 mostly because of the more ambiguous geopolitical posture of its government, as well as a less solid reform track record in recent years. As doubts about the true EU commitment of Georgia’s government remain, the EU’s decision in December 2023 to grant candidate status should mostly be seen as a geopolitical signal to the overwhelmingly pro-European Georgian population.

Key accession dynamics in the past decade
The Western Balkan countries have long been struck by a similar enlargement fatigue as observed within the EU throughout the 2010s, with a lack of reforms in the region having primarily led to the current situation. Although exact dynamics differ from country to country, a slow pace of reforms, ethno-nationalist politics, state capture dynamics and, in certain cases, undue geopolitical balancing remain present, collectively hampering the prospects of swift accession.

The EU approach has, however, also exacerbated negative dynamics. Even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the commitment to the accession process with the Western Balkans has remained ambiguous. On the one hand, the European Commission has sought to use the momentum to step up its discourse by admitting past mistakes and reassuring that the future of the Western Balkans lies within the EU. The European Commission has also proposed a Growth Plan for the Western Balkans that outlines tangible ways by which the candidates can partially integrate with the EU’s internal market before full membership.9 Additionally, European Council President Charles Michel has called for 2030 to be recognised as the target date for both the EU and the candidates to be ready, contributing to the ongoing debate on how the EU itself should prepare for new members.10

On the other hand, internal divides within the European Union continue to hamper its credibility and straightforwardness. While Orbán’s government in December pointed to outstanding reform requirements in Ukraine, it simultaneously pleads for the swift accession of its political ally Serbia into the bloc.11 Furthermore, Austria almost unconditionally supports Bosnia and Herzegovina’s start of accession talks in spite of severe stability issues in the country that hold reform progress ransom, while Greece is blocking Albania over an issue with a Greek minority major in Albania’s south. Meanwhile, the Netherlands may – after a few years of taking a relatively constructive position during the Rutte IV government – revert to its more traditional rigid approach following the outcomes of its November 2023 elections.

All in all, internal divides within the EU make it challenging to reward reform successes in some Western Balkans candidates while effectively addressing undue geopolitical balancing and democratic backsliding in others. Overall, the EU’s approach in the Western Balkans seems to be mostly guided by short-term stability concerns over longer-term transformative objectives, as well as by a fear of pushing especially Serbia and Republika Srpska further into Russia’s hands. These dynamics have undermined the straightforwardness and credibility of the accession perspective.

What does the future hold for the Eastern trio’s accession process?
It would be a miracle for the Eastern trio to escape the arduous maze of joining the EU without running into any of the dead ends that countries in the Western Balkans have either entered themselves or been confronted with. Member states may try and battle out any bilateral issues or geopolitical games – or both – through blocking next steps in the process. For instance, Orbán symbolically stepped back during the December European Council to allow Ukraine moving forward, but he could still raise objections, such as concerns about the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Western Ukraine or any other excuse concerning relations with Russia, to obstruct next steps.

The opportunities to do so are ample. Member states wield veto authority at every stage of the accession procedure; not only during the opening and closing negotiations at large, but also concerning individual policy ‘chapters’. It is also uncertain for how long the geopolitical momentum will remain. Within the EU, both attention to and support for Ukraine are slowly showing the first signs of wear, while calls for some sort of negotiated resolution to Russia’s invasion are becoming louder.

What is more, the EU debate on internal reforms remains mostly in an inception phase. That is problematic as several EU leaders, including European Commission President Von der Leyen, have tied the future of accession to the future of EU internal reform. Arguably, reforms in EU policies, budgetary frameworks, decision-making processes and institutional structures are needed for accommodating an EU of thirty or more members. In the end, EU enlargement should make the EU stronger, and to do so, the perspective of new members joining should be used to reflect on existing and potential future deficiencies.

Arguably, in the short run, welcoming two or even three new EU members is possible also with the way the EU is currently functioning, especially if they constitute smaller countries. However, in the medium to long term, a lack of progress on the EU’s internal reform debate may hamper the accession process of any candidate, be it from the Western Balkans or from the Eastern trio.

It will soon become clear whether the EU manages to stay on a constructive path with the Eastern trio

There are also questions on the side of the candidates themselves. While accession negotiations may progress in times of open conflict, it is hard to foresee how Ukraine could enter the EU without some sort of political resolution that puts an end to it. As long as Russia continues to occupy large parts of the country, it can effectively hold Ukrainian EU membership hostage, unless Ukraine would give these lands up – something that can and should not be demanded from this country and would set a very dangerous geopolitical precedent for the years to come, endangering the future of democratic Europe at large. Alternatively, a model similar to the one previously implemented for Cyprus, allowing a de facto divided Ukraine to join the EU, could be explored.

Regarding the pace of reform efforts in the Eastern trio, there are questions of sustainability. The longer the Russian invasion drags on, the harder it will become for Ukraine to assign resources to reforms and thereby keep up momentum. For Moldova, the upcoming presidential elections, coupled with a referendum on EU membership scheduled for November 2024, and subsequent parliamentary elections in 2025, will prove a litmus test for the EU integration path the current government pursues. Meanwhile, in Georgia, the government’s ambiguous reform commitment could relapse to outright state capture dynamics.

It will soon become clear whether the EU manages to stay on a constructive path with the Eastern trio. In March, following a European Commission assessment to determine if Ukraine has implemented the final reform requirements as outlined in the Avis, the EU member states will need to unanimously decide to adopt a negotiation framework. Subsequently, negotiations on the fundamental policy cluster will commence. The same process applies to Moldova.

Maintaining the momentum of the process is arguably in the EU’s best interest – not only to continue support for Ukraine in dark times, but also to preserve the credibility of EU accession policies at large. Whether the sense of urgency is strong enough to turn EU enlargement into a success for now remains an open question.

• 1BBC News, ‘EU to open accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova’, December 14, 2023.
• 2Parlementaire Monitor, ‘Associatie-overeenkomst EU-Oekraïne’, accessed January 12, 2023.
• 3Ukraine: 28 February. Moldova and Georgia: 3 March.
• 4Rebecca Leppert, ‘How exactly do countries join the EU?’, Pew Research Center, July 27, 2022.
• 5See for example Paul Schmidt & Vedran Dzihic, ‘Europe Must Seize this Opportunity to Enlarge – and Reform’, Balkaninsight, October 17, 2023.
• 6Wouter Zweers, ‘Dutch Parliament demands geopolitical alignment in EU enlargement’, Clingendael op-ed, February 2, 2023.
• 7European Commission, ‘2023 Ukraine EU enlargement report (SWD (2023) 699 Final)’, November 8, 2023.
• 8European Commission, ‘2023 Moldova EU enlargement report (SWD (2023) 699 Final)’, November 8, 2023.
• 9European Commission, ‘2023 Regulation proposal Reform and Growth Facility Western Balkans’, November 7, 2023.
• 10Lili Bayer, ‘Charles Michel: Get ready by 2030 to enlarge EU’, Politico, August 28, 2023.
• 11See X, tweet by Hungarian President Katalin Novák, October 16, 2023.